SANNER PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/19/2022 4:38 PM

Note
SETTLING OLD SCORES: PROPOSING
TARGETED REGULATION TO MITIGATE THE
PROBLEM OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES
MARY GENEVIEVE SANNER†
ABSTRACT
Antiquities looting rips artifacts out of their historical and
archaeological context. It deprives countries of their cultural property,
and instead allows those artifacts to be sold or auctioned to wealthy
individuals on the private market. Current enforcement mechanisms
provide inadequate deterrence to the secondary market for these
antiquities. A recent amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act could provide
a solution. However, regulations enacted pursuant to that amendment
should not simply transpose requirements and red flags from the
financial context to the art context. They should look beyond concerns
that looting might be used to fund terrorism and should instead
consider looting a harm and illegal activity in and of itself. When
drafting regulations FinCEN could look to voluntary museum
guidance and provenance guides to identify risk factors and red flags
particular to looting. These include the condition of the antiquities,
their geographic source, their provenance documentation, and whether
they appear in a stolen art database. These changes could hopefully
lead to a more transparent, compliant antiquities market.

INTRODUCTION
The Gilgamesh Dream Tablet is the first in a series of twelve
3,500-year-old cuneiform tablets which recount the Epic of Gilgamesh,
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one of the earliest known works of literature.1 Archaeologists
discovered the twelve tablets in 1853, in the ruins of the Library of
Ashurbanipal, an Assyrian king.2 During the Gulf War, the Dream
Tablet was stolen from an Iraqi museum.3 It reappeared in 2003 when
an American dealer purchased it in London and transported it to the
United States without proper declaration to customs.4 The American
dealer sold the tablet in 2007 with a false provenance letter, which
claimed the tablet had been found among a box of bronze fragments,
purchased at auction in 1981.5 In 2014, craft-chain Hobby Lobby
bought the tablet for $1.7 million to include in its Museum of the Bible
in Washington, D.C.6 The federal government brought a civil forfeiture
action against the tablet in 2020.7 Hobby Lobby agreed to surrender
the tablet and claimed it was not aware of the tablet’s prior illegal
importation.8
Hobby Lobby then sued Christie’s, the auction house through
which it had purchased the tablet. In its complaint, Hobby Lobby took
aim at the failure of large auction houses to investigate provenance and
verify ownership. Provenance is “[t]he history of the ownership of a

1. See Gilgamesh Dream Tablet: Iraq Puts Looted Artefact on Display, BBC (Dec. 7, 2021)
[hereinafter Gilgamesh Dream Tablet], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-59561151
[https://perma.cc/B2LA-ZQEE].
2. Id. The remains of the Library of Ashurbanipal were discovered in modern-day northern
Iraq. Don Vaughan, A Brief History of Libraries, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/story/a-brief-history-of-libraries [https://perma.cc/UM29-HAXN]. The
library dates back to the seventh century BC and contained approximately 30,000 inscribed
tablets, including the Tablets of Gilgamesh. Id.
3. Gilgamesh Dream Tablet, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Complaint, United States v. One Cuneiform Tablet Known as the “Gilgamesh Dream
Tablet,” No. 20-CV-2222 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020), ECF No. 1.
8. Brigit Katz, Smuggled Gilgamesh Dream Tablet Returns to Iraq, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/hobby-lobby-forfeits-rare-gilga
mesh-tablet-smuggled-iraq-180978314 [https://perma.cc/J926-EN49]. Comparatively, in a 2017
forfeiture Hobby Lobby paid a $3 million fine in connection with the purchase of approximately
250 looted Iraqi tablets. Jane Arraf, Hobby Lobby’s Illegal Antiquities Shed Light on a Lost,
Looted Ancient City in Iraq, NPR (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/
623537440/hobby-lobbys-illegal-antiquities-shed-light-on-a-lost-looted-ancient-city-in-ira [https:/
/perma.cc/G97B-8K36]. Hobby Lobby had been warned by its own consultant that the tablets
were likely stolen property. Chris Boyette, Hobby Lobby To Pay $3 Million Fine, Forfeit Ancient
Artifacts, CNN (July 6, 2017, 6:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/05/us/hobby-lobby-ancientartifacts-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/FU82-6RRP].
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work of art or an antique.”9 The craft chain asserted that “[c]ollectors
also rely on the expertise of sophisticated art sellers, such as established
galleries and auctioneers, to verify an object’s legal ownership.”10 The
company further alleged that Christie’s had communicated with the
American dealer and either knew or should have known that the
provenance was false.11 The suit against Christie’s is ongoing, though
in September of 2021, the United States finally returned the tablet to
Iraq.12
This sale was just one of the thousands that regularly take place in
the market for looted antiquities. Looting is “the removal of culturally
significant material from archaeological sites for commercial gain.”13
Some estimate that the looted antiquities trade is a multibillion-dollar
illegal industry, second only to the black-markets for weapons and
drugs.14 In South America, unlawful excavation sites may even be large
enough to be seen from satellites.15 Looting damages historical
artifacts, impedes historical discovery and research, and deprives
politically unstable countries of their cultural heritage. Looting
removes artifacts from their “locational and stratigraphical context”16
9. Provenance, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/153408
[https://perma.cc/ZZ2U-F8TH]. This record of ownership can be “used as a guide to authenticity
or quality.” Id.
10. First Amended Complaint at 8, Hobby Lobby Stores v. Christie’s Inc., No. 20-CV-2239
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2021), ECF No. 25.
11. Id. at 7–8.
12. Gilgamesh Dream Tablet, supra note 1.
13. Blythe Bowman Proulx, Archaeological Site Looting in “Glocal” Perspective: Nature,
Scope, and Frequency, 117 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 111, 111 n.5 (2013). Colloquially, and for the
purpose of this Note, looting also includes cultural items stolen from museums, monuments,
churches, and similar sites.
14. See, e.g., STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, COMBATING ILLEGAL ANTIQUITIES TRADE
1 (2018), https://av.sc.com/corp-en/others/Combating-Illegal-Antiquities-Trade_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4J6M-F8DE]. But see MATTHEW SARGENT, JAMES V. MARRONE, ALEXANDRA T.
EVANS, BILYANA LILLY, ERIK NEMETH & STEPHEN DALZELL, RAND, TRACKING AND
DISRUPTING THE ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES TRADE WITH OPEN-SOURCE DATA, at xii [hereinafter
RAND REPORT], https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2706.html [https://perma.cc/
3KC7-6UEY] (disputing the oft-cited multibillion dollar figure and arguing that the entire market
is “not likely to be larger than a few hundred million dollars each year”).
15. See Rebecca Hersher, Space Archaeologist Wants Citizen Scientists To Identify
Archaeological Looting, NPR (Jan. 31, 2017, 3:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/01/31/512661370/space-archaeologist-wants-citizen-scientists-to-identify-archaeological-looting
[https://perma.cc/2NEL-GEU4] (describing a citizen scientist project wherein users help identify
signs of looting on satellite images of Peru).
16. Arthur Miller, Archaeological Looting: A New Approach to the Problem, 24 PENN
MUSEUM 35, 41 (1982).
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and prevents historians from “fully understand[ing] and
reconstruct[ing] the past.”17 Looters “sometimes break[] and damag[e]
the antiquities in the process of excavation and transportation.”18
Looting also allows for the easy introduction of forgeries into the
market.19 Finally, looting permits antiquities dealers to profit from the
theft of cultural property, which many argue rightfully belongs to the
people of the modern-day country in which it is found.20 As the largest
art market in the world,21 and a frequent destination for looted
antiquities,22 the United States is in a unique position to address these
harms.
Neither self-regulation nor the current statutory framework is
sufficient to handle the volume of illegal importations of looted
antiquities. Self-regulation, though frequently promoted by industry
insiders,23 is doomed to failure because of well-established norms of
secrecy that proliferate in the art and antiquities markets,24 as well as
fundamental disagreements over the ethical implications of collecting

17. Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the
Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 170 (2007) [hereinafter Gerstenblith, Controlling
the International Market in Antiquities].
18. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., S. Dist. of N.Y., Antiquities Dealer Charged with
Trafficking in Looted Cambodian Artifacts (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/
pr/antiquities-dealer-charged-trafficking-looted-cambodian-artifacts [https://perma.cc/9FS6RJYB].
19. Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at 172.
20. See Illicit Trafficking, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/fighttrafficking [https://perma.cc/
88NM-9HYR] (noting that illicit trafficking of cultural property “deprives people of their history
and culture”).
21. See CLARE MCANDREW, ART BASEL & UBS, THE ART MARKET 2021, at 34 (2021),
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/The-Art-Market_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/V483-XV2S]
(“The US market retained its leading position in the global ranks with a share of 42% of sales by
value.”).
22. See id. at 45–46 (describing how the relatively weak anti-money laundering regulations
in the United States allow for illegal transactions to occur that could not occur in the United
Kingdom).
23. See Cultural Property Issues, INT’L ASS’N OF DEALERS IN ANCIENT ART, https://
iadaa.org/preface [https://perma.cc/FGL8-JZZD] (“The trade has more incentive than anyone
else to stop the crooks because of the damage they risk causing the reputation of the legitimate
trade.”); Georgina Adam, How Transparent Is the Art Market?, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), https:/
/www.ft.com/content/77cba886-251b-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025 [https://perma.cc/PP5B-G6Y5]
(“Clinton Howell, president of the International Confederation of Art and Antique Dealer
Associations, argues for self-regulation. ‘Top-down government regulation would be a huge
threat to transparency. It would make inappropriate decisions about how to “regulate” the art
trade, based solely on popular support.’”).
24. See infra Part II.A.
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cultural property.25 Dealers know that if they press sellers on
provenance or insist that buyers and sellers identify themselves, they
will lose business to their competitors who do not take such
precautions.26 Additionally, while consensus is growing, not everyone
in the industry believes that antiquities ought to remain in their home
countries.27 Without consensus or group enforcement mechanisms,
self-regulation within the market will continue to leave the growing
problem of looting unaddressed.
Federal enforcement is also inadequate. The federal government
has ample enforcement tools including The National Stolen Property
Act (“NSPA”),28 U.S. Customs Laws,29 the Convention on Cultural
Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”),30 and, to the extent that the
sale of antiquities might fund terrorism, anti-terrorism laws.31 Though
the federal government has aggressively initiated forfeiture actions for
stolen antiquities in recent years,32 because of the volume of antiquities

25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See Adam, supra note 23 (“Dealers and galleries need to respect vendors’ requests to
remain unidentified; otherwise they will simply take their business elsewhere.”).
27. See Erin Thompson, Successes and Failures of Self-Regulatory Regimes Governing
Museum Holdings of Nazi-Looted Art and Looted Antiquities, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 379, 400–
01 (2014) (finding that, in contrast to Nazi-looted art, museums often encourage the acquisition
of antiquities as core to their mission); infra note 85 (questioning the view that antiquities should
remain in their home country).
28. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (criminalizing the transportation and sale of stolen goods).
29. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (making items introduced into the U.S. subject to
forfeiture if “stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced”); 18 U.S.C. § 542
(making it unlawful to import merchandise “by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal . . . as to
any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement”); 18
U.S.C. § 545 (making it unlawful to “receive[], conceal[], buy[], sell[], or in any manner facilitate[]
the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same
to have been imported . . . contrary to law”); 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (allowing for forfeiture of items not
properly declared upon entry to the country).
30. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (making any cultural property stolen from any “museum or
religious or secular public monument or similar institution in a State Party” after January 12, 1983,
forfeitable).
31. See Stephen Juris & Brian Remondino, The Current Fight Against Contraband Art and
Antiquities, LAW360 (Oct. 20, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/973884/thecurrent-fight-against-contraband-art-and-antiquities [https://perma.cc/YF4T-DQSW] (noting
that using the sale of looted antiquities to fund terrorism could violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339A but that
no such cases have been reported).
32. See Nikita Lalwani, State of the Art: How Cultural Property Became a National Security
Priority, 130 YALE L.J. F. 78, 79 (2020) (“Since 2007, ICE has returned some 12,500 artifacts to
over thirty countries.”).
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on the market,33 and the difficulties of identifying false provenance,34
underenforcement is likely inevitable.
The money laundering regulatory framework originally devised
for banks and other financial institutions may provide the solution.
Recently, the Anti-Money Laundering Act (“AMLA”) of 2020 added
“dealers in antiquities” to the Bank Secrecy Act’s list of “financial
institutions.”35 The Bank Secrecy Act requires regulated financial
institutions36 to maintain anti-money laundering (“AML”) programs
and to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) with the
government.37 Concern that criminals may use antiquities to fund
terrorism or to evade economic sanctions motivated Congress to pass
the AMLA and to include antiquities dealers in the list of financial
institutions.38 However, the sale of looted antiquities falls within the
ambit of the AMLA regardless of whether or not the proceeds are
subsequently used to fund terrorist activity.39 Congress tasked the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) with
33. See Kris Hollington, After Drugs and Guns, Art Theft Is the Biggest Criminal Enterprise
in the World, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2014, 10:59 AM), https://www.newsweek.com
/2014/07/18/after-drugs-and-guns-art-theft-biggest-criminal-enterprise-world-260386.html [https:/
/perma.cc/YSL2-ANN7] (noting that the criminal income generated by art crime is thought to be
$6–8 billion but that accurate figures are impossible to estimate and that looted pieces may be
sold multiple times).
34. See id. (describing provenance as “a potted history full of blanks, anomalies and
guesswork”).
35. William M. Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub.
L. No. 116-283, § 6110(a), 134 Stat. 3388, 3415 [hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act];
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).
36. The definition of financial institutions under the BSA currently includes twenty-four
industries in addition to two catch-all or discretionary categories. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(Z).
Most similar to antiquities dealers are “dealer[s] in precious metals, stones, or jewels.” See id.
37. What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [https:/
/perma.cc/MG62-2DYN].
38. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., ART
INDUSTRY AND U.S. POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE SANCTIONS 3, 14 (2020) [hereinafter
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS], https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-07-29%20
PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20The%20Art%20Industry%20and%20U.S.%20Policies%20
that%20Undermine%20Sanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UXA-W6QR] (expressing concern that
“secrecy, anonymity, and a lack of regulation create an environment ripe for laundering money
and evading sanctions” and recommending that art dealers be subject to the BSA).
39. See FinCEN Notice, FinCEN Informs Financial Institutions of Efforts Related to Trade
in Antiquities and Art, at 1–2 (Mar. 9, 2021) [hereinafter FinCEN Notice], https://www.fin
cen.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/FinCEN%20Notice%20on%20Antiquities%
20and%20Art_508C.pdf [https://perma.cc/55ZS-KK3G] (“Crimes relating to antiquities and art
may include looting or theft, the illicit excavation of archaeological items, smuggling, and the sale
of stolen or counterfeit objects.” (emphasis added)).
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promulgating specific regulations.40 As of the time of publication those
regulations are still forthcoming.41
This Note argues that the Bank Secrecy Act has the potential to
prompt a culture shift within the notoriously opaque art and antiquities
market and to provide a preemptive solution to the failures of selfregulation and underenforcement in the market for trafficked
antiquities. However, it will be most successful if the regulations are
tailored to looting and provenance concerns and if the regulation itself
identifies red flags for looted antiquities. FinCEN should look to
voluntary dealer and museum due diligence and provenance guidelines
for inspiration. General requirements that dealers verify beneficial
owners and sources of funds prior to a transaction will help but will not
get to the heart of the suspicious activity present in the antiquities
trade. This Note is the first to suggest that the government model
regulations off industry provenance guides, and among the first to
focus on looting in addition to terrorism.42
Part I of this Note addresses the opacity of the art and antiquities
markets and the failures of self-regulation. Part II contrasts the
available enforcement mechanisms with the monitoring mechanisms
available under the Bank Secrecy Act. Part III argues that regulations
drafted for dealers in precious metals and stones and for the U.K. fine
art market are not sufficiently tailored to the risk of antiquities looting.
Part IV proposes that FinCEN regulations emphasize provenance
research in their due diligence requirements and focus on the red flags
associated with antiquities looting, rather than mirroring the generic

40. Id.
41. See Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Dealers in Antiquities: Unified Agenda, FIN.
CRIMES ENF’ T NETWORK, https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FINCEN-2021-0006/unifiedagenda [https://perma.cc/U9E9-UW5U] (noting that a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is
anticipated in 2023).
42. Scholarship has yet to address the 2021 amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act. Other
scholarship focuses on the risk of terrorism and laundering the proceeds of illicit activity. See
Alessandra Dagirmanjian, Note, Laundering the Art Market: A Proposal for Regulating Money
Laundering Through Art in the United States, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
687, 691 (2019) (noting that “unique characteristics of the art market make it particularly
vulnerable to money laundering”). By contrast, this Note focuses on the inherent harm of looting,
even absent evidence of terrorist activity. Finally, scholarship appears critical of attempts to
regulate the art and antiquities market. See Timothy E. Burroughs, Note, US and EU Efforts to
Combat International Money Laundering in Art Market Are No Masterpiece, 52 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1061, 1064 (2019) (arguing that “adding to [dealers’] burden could prove
devastatingly expensive and ineffective”). This Note argues that the market can adapt to a new
system.
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requirements applicable to financial markets. Finally, Part V argues
that the application of AML standards to the antiquities market could
drive a culture of compliance and looks at the effect of the BSA on the
diamond industry.
I. ART MARKETS ARE OPAQUE AND ILL-SUITED TO SELFREGULATION
Two features of art and antiquities markets present major
concerns for looting.43 First, art markets notoriously lack
transparency.44 Second, art market participants are especially resistant
to regulation by outsiders and fail to self-regulate.45 This Part will
address these concerns in turn and lay the groundwork for the
argument that the antiquities market requires external regulation.
A. The Opacity of the Art Market Perpetuates Looting
Traditions of secrecy in the art market date back centuries and still
predominate today. In the art market, secrecy connotes “discretion,
tradition and class, not duplicity.”46 Dealers and clients alike value
secrecy both for the security and for the mystique it provides. While
the modern market has made some concessions to transparency,47
problems remain. Recently, a survey indicated market participants
viewed lack of transparency as one of the most significant threats to
the art market.48 This Section will address how art market participants
43. There is no single, agreed upon definition of an antiquity, but this Note uses the term to
refer to art and objects created before the Middle Ages. Antiquity, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8833 [https://perma.cc/TNU4-VU54]. The antiquities
market falls under the larger umbrella of the art market, which also includes categories like fine
art. Because the antiquities market is a subset of the art market, and because both the larger art
market and the antiquities market present similar transparency concerns, this Note will use the
terms interchangeably when discussing market transparency.
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. Graham Bowley, As Money Launderers Buy Dalís, U.S. Looks at Lifting the Veil on Art
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/arts/design/moneylaundering-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/Z6LD-ELRG].
47. See id. (acknowledging that auction houses have begun to publish estimates of the prices
they expect works of art to command).
48. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT 2019, at 207 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter
DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT], https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Doc
uments/financial-services/artandfinance/lu-art-and-finance-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V223-CQHJ] (finding that 77 percent of wealth managers and 75 percent of collectors consider
lack of transparency a key threat).
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transact through “art advisers,” and establish shell companies to
preserve anonymity and how these practices interfere with antiquities
dealers’ due diligence.
Buyers and sellers of artworks transact through art advisers or
agents to conceal their identities, not only from the public, but also
from the auction houses and dealers facilitating the transactions.
Auction catalogs identify sources of art with monikers like, “‘Property
of a Lady of Title’, ‘From a distinguished European collection’ and
other such smokescreens.”49 Intermediaries known as art advisers
regularly represent both buyers and sellers in art transactions.50
Frequently, purchasers cannot ask who they are purchasing from, and
sellers cannot ask who they are selling to.51 The auction houses which
facilitate the transactions also remain in the dark. Dealers worry that
“serious collectors or particularly well-known individuals and
celebrities may be reluctant to show a passport or driver’s license, to
say nothing of producing a recent utility bill” when making a
purchase.52 Dealers also worry that asking for identification may serve
as an additional barrier to sale.53 To cope with this problem, auction
houses sometimes treat the art adviser as the principal purchaser, and
perform all due diligence required by voluntarily adopted AML
policies on the art adviser, rather than on the actual purchaser.54
Smaller dealers may not maintain AML policies at all and instead rely
on proxies such as networks of trust and gut instinct to identify
suspicious transactions.55
To further preserve anonymity, buyers use shell companies56 to
mask transactions.57 The use of shell companies in art purchases

49. Adam, supra note 23.
50. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 3.
51. Id.
52. MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 45.
53. See id. (“Even if they do not mind in principle, securing this information risks diminishing
a client’s impulse to purchase.”).
54. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 3.
55. Id.
56. A shell company is a company that registers with the SEC and may hold assets, but which
has no significant business activity. Will Kenton, Shell Corporation, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shellcorporation.asp [https://perma.cc/9FTA-ZCDA]. The
AMLA now requires shell companies to divulge beneficial owners to the Treasury Department.
National Defense Authorization Act, supra note 35, § 6403.
57. See Scott Reyburn, What the Panama Papers Reveal About the Art Market, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/arts/design/what-the-panama-papers-
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concerned Congress, which feared it could be used to disguise criminal
activity.58 For instance, in the wake of the 2014 Russian annexation of
Crimea, Russian brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were
sanctioned and placed on the Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (“SDNs”).59 However, the brothers evaded these
sanctions when they subsequently purchased and resold $18 million of
art through auction houses and private sales in New York.60 A Senate
report revealed that the Rotenbergs used an American art adviser
based out of Russia who paid for the art with funds received from shell
companies supposedly traced to the Rotenbergs.61 The Rotenbergs
used anonymity to violate the law. However, even legitimate uses of
anonymity62 may perpetuate antiquities looting.
Anonymity protects secondary markets for looted antiquities
because it presents challenges for due diligence. Currently, dealers
struggle to identify suspicious transactions, and regulators struggle to
track “art sales or profits” as they would when “review[ing] the transfer
of other substantial assets, like stocks or real estate.”63 Anonymity may
also obscure authenticity or provenance. For example, the Knoedler
Gallery resold paintings that came from a mysterious Mr. X, an
anonymous Swiss collector who supposedly obtained his art directly
from the famous Abstract Expressionist studios.64 Mr. X transacted

reveal-about-the-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/2UGJ-9MUW] (“The so-called Panama
Papers . . . have given us a deep look into the many ways offshore shell companies are used to
conceal the ownership of art.”).
58. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 39 (“Shell companies play a
significant role in contributing to anti-money laundering vulnerabilities in the U.S. art industry.”).
59. MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 46.
60. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 13.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Buyers may legitimately rely on anonymous transactions to guard against art theft. See
Anonymity and the Art Market, AMINEDDOLEH & ASSOCS. LLC, https://www.artandiplawfirm
.com/anonymity-and-the-art-market [https://perma.cc/H3DR-R6MY] (noting that anonymity can
provide security from theft). Sellers might proceed anonymously to prevent speculation about
bankruptcy. Graham Bowley & William K. Rashbaum, Has the Art Market Become an Unwitting
Partner in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/arts/design/
has-the-art-market-become-an-unwitting-partner-in-crime.html [https://perma.cc/NFM7-NRCD].
These reasons justify anonymity vis-à-vis the public, not the auction houses facilitating the
transactions.
63. Bowley, supra note 46.
64. M.H. Miller, The Big Fake: Behind the Scenes of Knoedler Gallery’s Downfall,
ARTNEWS (Apr. 25, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.artnews.com/art-news/artists/the-big-fakebehind-the-scenes-of-knoedler-gallerys-downfall-6179 [https://perma.cc/6X3M-YHXZ].
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exclusively through Ms. Rosales, an unknown Long Island art dealer.65
Eventually, authorities discovered that Mr. X did not exist and that Ms.
Rosales, along with several others, sold forgeries of Abstract
Expressionist work painted by a man in Queens.66 The scandal
contributed to the shuttering of the Knoedler Gallery, formerly the
oldest gallery in the United States.67 Similarly, in the antiquities
market, anonymous links in the provenance chain may mask illegal
importations.
B. The Antiquities Market Is Ill-Suited to Self-Regulation
The art market is not equipped to address the dangers posed by
lack of transparency by itself and yet has long governed itself almost
exclusively through self-regulation. Dealers and museums adopt
recommended best practices and codes of conduct.68 The four largest
auction houses have adopted voluntary compliance programs69 and, in
some cases, specific restitution and provenance departments.70 Smaller
art dealers generally do not have compliance programs but may consult
AML attorneys.71 Still, as this Section will address, the antiquities
market struggles to self-regulate.
While preferences have recently shifted slightly,72 art professionals
overwhelmingly believe that self-regulation is the best method for

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at
190 (noting that professional organizations have codes of ethics that prevent members from acting
to “enhance the value of undocumented artifacts” and that dealers’ associations have codes of
ethics that regulate conduct, but may be ambiguous).
69. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 3.
70. See Restitution, SOTHEBY’S, https://www.sothebys.com/en/about/services/restitution
[https://perma.cc/8FGR-QVA8] (stating that Sotheby’s is committed to the resolution of the
problems that can arise in respect of works of art displaced between 1933 and 1945); Our
Guidelines for Nazi-era Art Restitution Issues, CHRISTIE’S, https://www.christies.com/en/services
/restitution-services/guidelines [https://perma.cc/WV85-LTUV] (stating that Christie’s is
committed to “clear and transparent” procedures for Nazi-era art).
71. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 3 (describing a private dealer
without compliance policies who relies on advice from lawyers when necessary).
72. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 210 (finding that 76 percent
of art professionals favored self-regulation in 2016 but only 72 percent of art professionals favored
self-regulation in 2019).
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establishing trust and credibility in the art market.73 This preference is
particularly pronounced in the United States.74 The president of the
International Confederation of Art and Antique Dealer Associations
(“CINOA”), advocates for self-regulation.75 He believes that “[t]opdown government regulation would be a huge threat to transparency.
It would make inappropriate decisions about how to ‘regulate’ the art
trade, based solely on popular support.”76 Similarly, the International
Association of Dealers in Ancient Art (“IADAA”) asked that the
authorities “base their decisions on independently verifiable evidence,
not on hearsay or unsubstantiated claims in media reports.”77 This
skepticism toward outside regulation provides insight into the attitudes
that make self-regulation unfeasible.
The first barrier to self-regulation is industry disagreement over
whether a serious problem even exists. While incidences of terrorism
financing or sanctions evasion may be rare,78 antiquities looting is
undoubtedly frequent.79 However, the IADAA webpage on looted
antiquities overwhelmingly rebuts reports on widespread trade in
looted antiquities80 and criticizes proposed regulation.81 CINOA
similarly publishes papers like “Bogus Information on Illicit Art Trade
to Justify New Regulations” on its Perspectives page.82 These
antiquities market players do not represent the views of the entire
73. See id. (finding that approximately three-quarters of art professionals favor selfregulation).
74. See id. (“In contrast, US wealth managers favor a self-regulation approach, with 73
percent of those surveyed expressing this view.”).
75. Adam, supra note 23.
76. Id.
77. Cultural Property Issues, supra note 23.
78. See RAND REPORT, supra note 14, at 7 (“[T]he scale, scope, and significance of the
antiquities trade and its role in terrorist, criminal, and militant financing remains poorly
understood.”).
79. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (noting the severity of antiquities looting).
80. See Cultural Property Issues, supra note 23 (providing links to articles and reports such
as “Millions and Billions – debunking the false information on the illicit trade” and “RAND
corporation report demolishes current thinking on antiquities trafficking”).
81. See id.; V.J. Geerling, IADAA Chairman, BRAFA Talk: An Unnecessary and Flawed
Regulation That Will Harm the Art Market (Jan. 28, 2019), https://iadaa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/02/BRAFA-Talk-by-V.J.-Geerling-30-01-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WP7-ZWS6] (arguing
that European Union regulations on the importation of cultural goods are “unnecessary and
flawed”).
82. CINOA Fact Sheet on Fighting Bogus Information About the Art Market – 02/2021,
CINOA, (Feb. 2021), https://www.cinoa.org/cinoa/perspectives/VoZu6XcBrQ_E_O4rixrh
[https://perma.cc/B3ZF-84GG].
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market.83 But they represent the views of many dealers,84 and they
demonstrate why voluntarily adopted self-regulation will fail as long as
recalcitrant market participants deny that there is a problem.
Lack of consensus also reflects the reality that the ethics of looted
antiquities are still up for debate. Some antiquities market participants
deny that trade in cultural heritage is a problem at all, even if it is
happening on a large scale.85 The industry now agrees that dealers
should not trade in art stolen by Nazis and that museums should not
hold Nazi-stolen art in their collections.86 However, the same consensus
does not exist for looted antiquities.87 Museum collection practices
illustrate this disparity in views. Voluntarily adopted museum
guidelines require museums both to evaluate future acquisitions and to
re-examine every object in the museum inventory to determine
whether it was stolen by Nazis.88 By contrast the same guidelines only
require museums to conduct provenance research for planned future
acquisitions of antiquities, not for items already held in inventory.89
The active debate over the propriety of keeping another country’s
cultural heritage is well-encapsulated by the arguments for the British
83. A representative of Christie’s said that the auction house “‘welcomes the opportunity to
work with U.S. regulators on appropriate and enforceable’ guidelines to combat money
laundering in the art market.” Zachary Small, Congress Poised To Apply Banking Regulations to
Antiquities Market, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/01/arts/design/
antiquities-market-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/Y2XW-S6ZS].
84. See About CINOA, CINOA, https://www.cinoa.org/cinoa/aboutus [https://perma.cc/
T8YQ-48HK] (“Its 30 member associations represent 20 countries and 5000 of the world’s leading
dealers.”).
85. For a slightly more nuanced argument in support of the antiquities trade, see Randall
Hixenbaugh, The Current State of the Antiquities Trade: An Art Dealer’s Perspective, 26 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 227, 227 (2019) (criticizing the practice of “[f]etishizing mundane ubiquitous
antiquities as sacrosanct objects of great national importance that must be retained within modern
borders in a globalized world” and noting that “[i]n many archaeologically rich countries,
antiquities are regarded as items to sell to foreigners at best or sacrilegious objects to be destroyed
at worst”).
86. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 381 (“AAM and AAMD leadership, as well as those
associated with museums, uniformly affirmed the importance of the return of Nazi-looted art.”).
87. See id. at 380 (finding that self-regulatory regimes are effective at handling the issue of
Nazi-looted art but fail to address looted antiquities because of lack of outside pressure and
consensus).
88. Id. at 392–93 (“Both sets of guidelines require museums to carry out provenance
research. The antiquities guidelines, however, only require museums to look at planned
acquisitions, while the Nazi-era guidelines require museums to look at both planned acquisitions
and every object currently in their collections.”).
89. Id. (“[T]he antiquities guidelines do nothing to address the issue of repatriation claims
for objects already in a museum’s collection.”).
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Museum’s retention of the Elgin Marbles.90 In the early nineteenth
century the Earl of Elgin, British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire,
removed many statues from the Parthenon and shipped them to
England.91 They are now displayed in the British museum and are
known as the Elgin Marbles. Greece has consistently requested the
return of the Marbles.92 The Trustees of the British Museum currently
argue that the marbles are “a part of the world’s shared heritage and
transcend political boundaries.”93 Others have argued that the Marbles
are better protected from damage in the British Museum, where “they
are well mounted, maintained, and guarded,” than in Greece where,
even if installed in the Acropolis Museum, they would be exposed “to
the danger involved in removal and transport.”94 Some have also
argued that cultural heritage ought to be distributed around the world
to allow more people access to common history.95 For example,
allowing museums outside of Greece to hold Greek artifacts allows
more people to learn about Greece and its cultural influence. So long
as these arguments endure, self-regulation is unlikely to succeed.
Market incentives present a second barrier to self-regulation. Art
market participants behave predictably when they cave to the demands
of their customers. When customers refuse to identify themselves,
dealers must accept their refusal or lose the sale.96 Dealers might find
it embarrassing or distasteful to question sellers whose business they
would like to court.97 Smaller dealers may decide that the risk of

90. Contrary to antiquities looted from Iraq in the past few decades, there is not a clear-cut
answer to whether the Marbles were illegally exported. The British Museum argues that Lord
Elgin “acted with the full knowledge and permission of the legal authorities of the day both in
Athens and London.” The Position of the Trustees of the British Museum, THE BRITISH MUSEUM,
https://www.britishmuseum.org/about-us/british-museum-story/objects-news/parthenon-sculptur
es/parthenon-sculptures-trustees [https://perma.cc/2AND-T7VR]. Elgin had permission from
Ottoman officials who controlled Athens of the time. John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the
Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1897–98 (1985). He may have exceeded the scope of his
permission by removing too many statues, but officials likely ratified his actions when they gave
orders to Athenian officials to allow Elgin’s shipments to leave the country. Id. at 1898–99.
91. Merryman, supra note 90, at 1882.
92. Id.
93. The Position of the Trustees of the British Museum, supra note 90.
94. Merryman, supra note 90, at 1917.
95. Id. at 1919–20.
96. Adam, supra note 23.
97. See Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at
179 (“Market participants excuse their failure to research the backgrounds of the antiquities they
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litigation is too low to justify expending limited resources on more
detailed investigations into identity or provenance.98 While auction
houses tend to maintain more robust due diligence practices than small
dealers,99 employees may fail to escalate concerns because of incentives
to secure business.100 In the most extreme cases, dealers might even try
to meet customer demand and make money by forging provenances.101
A voluntarily adopted AML program may actually be worse for
dealers than a mandatory one because, absent a binding legal directive,
dealers cannot say “[I]t is not me, it’s the law, I trust you,” when “they
ask clients for their passports and utility bills.”102
These financial incentives limit the potential success of selfregulatory measures in the art market. A Basel Institute on
Governance working paper on the art trade proposed a self-regulatory
initiative but noted that “there is still a gap to bridge between
stakeholders’ deeper insights and their actual commitment to
addressing the problem.”103 The paper similarly expressed concern that
stakeholders tended to regard calls for regulation as “mere media
hype.”104 More recently, a Continuing Legal Education webinar noted
that the art market had a weak culture of compliance and had “yet to

acquire by saying they want to protect the seller by not asking too many questions, they want to
maintain a competitive edge against other dealers . . . .”).
98. See id. at 181 (“[S]o long as the risks of detection and meaningful punishment remain
low, the conduct of those market participants who violate the law will not be deterred.”).
99. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 3 (noting that auction houses
maintain voluntary AML policies while private dealers may have no written policies).
100. Some argue that auction houses maintain paper compliance programs that they disregard
in practice. Neil Brodie, an archaeologist associated with Oxford, noted “the standard and
transparency of internal due diligence as regards the investigation of provenance are weak.”
Specifically, he asserted that auction houses readily accept “[f]alse provenances supplied by
consignors.” Neil Brodie, Auction Houses and the Antiquities Trade, in 3RD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS ON THE RETURN OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 70 (2014). He expressed
concern that “not one auction house employee has faced criminal charges arising out of auction
house malpractice.” Id. at 71.
101. See Margaret Carrigan, Two Manhattan Antiquities Dealers Arrested on Charges of
Fraud, ART NEWSPAPER (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2020/09/23
/two-manhattan-antiquities-dealers-arrested-on-charges-of-fraud [https://perma.cc/4RE62MVK] (reporting that two Manhattan antiquities dealers ran a five-year scheme to sell
antiquities with suspicious export licensing and false provenances).
102. MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 46.
103. Thomas Christ & Claudia von Selle, Basel Art Trade Guidelines 8 (Basel Inst. on
Governance, Working Paper No. 12, 2018), https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/
files/2019-06/190613_WP_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/35EK-HTAG].
104. Id.
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embrace the importance and value of embedding compliance and
ethical decision making into the fabric of the business.”105 Art market
attempts at self-regulation, while well-intentioned, struggle to
overcome norms of secrecy or to control the actions of members
without the full force of law. The market needs a different remedy.
II.

CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME PROVIDES ENFORCEMENT
HOOKS BUT INADEQUATE MONITORING

The current statutory framework allows the government to seize
looted art, as it did when it returned the Dream Tablet to Iraq.
However, the statutory framework does not require monitoring or
provide for regulation of the antiquities market. This Section will first
describe the current statutory framework. It will then address the BSA,
which provides opportunity for regular monitoring of the antiquities
market.
A. The Existing Statutory Framework
Though the art market lacks external regulation and monitoring,
the United States has many enforcement hooks with which to recover
and return internationally looted artifacts to their home countries. The
government can recover looted objects (1) if they qualify as stolen
property and their importation violates the National Stolen Property
Act (“NSPA”),106 (2) if their importation violates U.S. Customs
Laws,107 or (3) if they were imported contrary to the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act.108 However, these enforcement
options cannot address the enormity of the problem.

105. Annemarie McAvoy, Marcus Asner, Patty Gerstenblith & Jane Levine, Compliance
Changes Coming to the Art World and Antiquities Dealers Due to the Recent Overhaul of the Bank
Secrecy Act, NYC BAR ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2021) [hereinafter NYC BAR ASS’N], https://www.nyc
bar.org/cle-offerings/compliance-changes-coming-to-the-art-world-and-antiquities-dealers-dueto-the-recent-overhaul-of-the-bank-secrecy-act [https://perma.cc/2A8Z-H45P].
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315.
107. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
108. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (making any cultural property stolen from any
“museum or religious or secular public monument or similar institution in a State Party” after
January 12, 1983, forfeitable). The United States also requires the return of all looted Native
American cultural heritage to lineal descendants, culturally affiliated Indian tribes, and Native
Hawaiian organizations with the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(“NAGPRA”). See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (requiring federal agencies and museums to
expeditiously return human remains and funerary objects to the respective Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization upon request or face a civil penalty). This Note focuses on international
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First, the United States can recover an object if it qualifies as
stolen property and its importation violates the National Stolen
Property Act. In the mid-nineteenth century, nations rich in
archaeological resources enacted laws that vested ownership of
archaeological objects in the nation.109 In 1934, Congress passed the
National Stolen Property Act, which prohibited transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce of any goods worth $5,000 or more that
a person knows have been stolen.110 In United States v. McClain,111 the
Fifth Circuit found that archaeological objects taken from countries
with vesting national cultural heritage laws qualify as stolen property
even after they have entered the United States.112 Once these objects
are identified as stolen cultural heritage, they are subject to “various
legal actions, including civil replevin, forfeiture, and criminal
prosecution.”113
Second, the United States can recover a looted object if it is
misdeclared on a customs form. U.S. customs law prohibits the
importation of objects which have been “stolen, smuggled, or
clandestinely imported.”114 Customs law also makes it unlawful to
import merchandise with false documentation, “without reasonable
cause to believe the truth of such statement.”115 Further, customs law
makes it unlawful to “receive[], conceal[], buy[], sell[], or in any
manner facilitate[] the transportation, concealment, or sale of such
looting just as Congress focused on international looting when it amended the BSA. It does not
take a position on whether violations of NAGPRA should fall within the scope of the new
regulation.
109. Patty Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework for the Prosecution of Crimes Involving
Archaeological Objects, 64 U.S. ATT’Y’S BULL. 5, 7 (2016) [hereinafter Gerstenblith, The Legal
Framework]. This approach contrasts with that of the United States where “artifacts discovered
on private land belong to the owner of the land; artifacts on government land belong likewise to
the owner of the land; and artifacts on unowned land belong to the finder.” HERBERT LAZEROW,
MASTERING ART LAW 318 (2d ed. 2020).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315.
111. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 996. Litigants must satisfy four elements to demonstrate that an object is owned
pursuant to a cultural heritage law:
(1) the vesting law must be clearly an ownership law on its face; (2) the nation’s
ownership rights must be enforced domestically, and not only upon illegal export; (3)
the object must have been found within the country claiming ownership; and (4) the
object must have been located within the country at the time the law was enacted.
Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework, supra note 109, at 7–8.
113. Id. at 7.
114. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 542.
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merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been
imported . . . contrary to law.”116 Violation of the NSPA establishes
that an importation is “contrary to law.”117 Both customs laws,118 and
the NSPA itself,119 permit forfeiture of improperly declared items.
Third, the United States can recover objects pursuant to the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act.120 The CPIA
provides enhanced protection because, unlike the NSPA or customs
laws, it does not require that the Government prove that the importer
had knowledge that the object was stolen.121 The United States may
enter into bilateral agreements with other countries “for the imposition
of import restrictions on certain categories of designated
archaeological or ethnological materials.”122 Examples include Maya
artifacts from Cara Sucia in El Salvador and Péten in Guatemala.123
Under this process, a violation of the other country’s export controls
on archaeological material becomes a violation of the United States’
import controls.124
Although the Department of Justice, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), and the FBI actively police these enforcement
hooks,125 the current laws provide no regular monitoring mechanism.

116. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 1497.
119. See Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework, supra note 109, at 8 (“[S]tolen property can also
be forfeited directly under the NSPA.”).
120. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (making any cultural property stolen from any “museum or
religious or secular public monument or similar institution in any State Party” after January 12,
1983, forfeitable).
121. See Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework, supra note 109, at 9 (“There is no need for the
government to establish that the importer had any knowledge of, or intent to commit, any
wrongdoing. This provision of the CPIA thus grants significant ‘enhanced’ protection beyond the
[NSPA] itself.”).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id. at 10.
125. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., S. Dist. of N.Y., Major Collection of
Cambodian and Southeast Asian Antiquities Is Subject of Forfeiture Action Filed in Manhattan
Federal Court (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/major-collection-cambodianand-southeast-asian-antiquities-subject-forfeiture-action [https://perma.cc/B67Q-BRW5] (announcing
the forfeiture of thirty-five Cambodian and Southeast Asian artifacts in a single civil forfeiture
complaint); Cultural Property, Art, and Antiquities Smuggling, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/investigations/cultural-property-art-and-antiquities-smuggling [https://
perma.cc/V4HN-XE7U], (last updated May 7, 2021) (noting that since 2007, Homeland Security
Investigations (“HSI”) has repatriated more than 12,000 objects to more than thirty countries);
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Enforcement depends on active law enforcement investigation,
sometimes initiated by tips.126 This system sometimes succeeds, as when
the government returned the Gilgamesh Tablet,127 or Skanda on a
Peacock, a sandstone statue plundered from a Cambodian temple.128
However, unlike the financial market, the antiquities market is not
currently subjected to regulatory exams or required to report any
suspicious activity.129
B. The Bank Secrecy Act
The Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) could ameliorate the lack of
transparency and failure of self-regulation and monitoring in the
antiquities market. The BSA requires financial institutions to help
government agencies to “detect and prevent money laundering.”130 To
satisfy this requirement, financial institutions must keep records of
cash purchases of negotiable instruments, file reports of cash
transactions exceeding $10,000, and report suspicious activity that

Art Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/arttheft [https://perma.cc/N2VN-3VMV] (noting that the FBI Art Crime Team, which investigates
“theft, fraud, looting, and trafficking across state and international lines,” has “recovered more
than 15,000 items valued at over $800 million” since its formation in 2004).
126. See Cultural Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/features/cpaa [https://perma.cc/8KYM-339J], (last updated Nov. 4,
2021) (“Members of the public who have information about suspected stolen cultural property
are urged to call the toll-free tip line . . . or to complete the online tip form.”).
127. See Tom Mashberg, The ‘Dream Tablet’ Nears the End of a Long Journey Home, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/arts/design/dream-tablet-Iraqartifact-returned.html [https://perma.cc/2LLT-5AEN] (describing the return of the “3,500-yearold clay tablet” to the Iraqi government following an HSI investigation).
128. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., S. Dist. of N.Y., 10th Century Statue Looted from
Cambodian Temple Is Subject of Forfeiture Action Filed in Manhattan Federal Court (July 15,
2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/10th-century-statue-looted-cambodian-templesubject-forfeiture-action-filed-manhattan [https://perma.cc/V2RR-KFM8].
129. See infra Part II.B (describing the antiquities market’s reliance on inadequate selfregulation). The current enforcement scheme also does not provide adequate deterrence. To
prosecute importers, the government must prove it knew the artifact was looted. Gerstenblith,
Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at 179–81. Though the
government can bring civil forfeiture actions, possessors only risk losing the artifact’s monetary
value. Id. at 180. When a dealer forfeits an artifact, the loss is small because of the substantial
mark-up on antiquities. Id. (noting that in Baghdad circa 2004, cylinder seals looted from the Iraq
museum sold for two hundred dollars each, while seals sold in end markets like New York and
London sold for one thousand dollars on average). Auction houses normally do not own the
object outright and thus lose only their commissions. Id. at 180 n.44.
130. The Bank Secrecy Act, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/
statutes-and-regulations/bank-secrecy-act [https://perma.cc/56MD-BH9T].
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could indicate money laundering, tax evasion, or other criminal
activities to FinCEN, an agency within the Department of the
Treasury.131 Financial institutions report suspicious activity by filing
SARs with FinCEN.132 FinCEN is then “responsible for distributing
[this] information within the government.”133 FinCEN also analyzes the
SAR data and provides “the resulting intelligence to investigators,
regulators, and the banking industry.”134 Under the BSA, financial
institutions must also establish compliance programs with designated
compliance officers.135 These compliance programs use a risk-based
approach that requires institutions to identify the specific risks
implicated by their business models and to deploy their resources
proportionately to address the most substantial risks.136 Recently the
AMLA added antiquities dealers to the list of financial institutions
covered by the BSA.137
Congress charged FinCEN with drafting regulations for the
antiquities market. Thus far, FinCEN has issued an Advance Notice of
Rulemaking to ask antiquities dealers for information about the
market and suggestions for regulation.138 Unsurprisingly, the dealers
who commented opposed any new regulations.139 Next, FinCEN will

131. Id.
132. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2019) (“This section ensures that national banks file a Suspicious
Activity Report when they detect a known or suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious
transaction related to money laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.”).
133. Statement from William F. Baity, Acting Director of FinCEN, 1st Review of the
Suspicious Activity Reporting System (SARS), FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (Apr. 1998), https:/
/www.fincen.gov/1st-review-suspicious-activity-reporting-system-sars [https://perma.cc/2YS2-ZZFW].
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1027.210 (2019) (requiring that dealers in precious metals, precious
stones, and jewelry maintain a designated compliance officer).
136. Specifically, a risk-based model “requires financial institutions to assess the risks
associated with illicit activities . . . they may face in order to reasonably deploy corresponding
resources before taking prioritized control measures as a response to these risks.” Zhang Fan,
The “Risk-Based” Principle of AML Management, ACAMS TODAY (Sept. 19, 2017), https://
www.acamstoday.org/the-risk-based-principle-of-aml-management [https://perma.cc/X9V4-DC4N].
137. National Defense Authorization Act, supra note 35, §§ 4561–4562.
138. Some dealers proposed that their specific type of antiquities trade be explicitly excluded
from the definition of “antiquities.” Some comments stressed that FinCEN should stop with
antiquities and not extend future regulations to fine art. Others suggested monetary thresholds
on dealers covered by the regulations. To read these comments, see generally Public Comments
on Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Dealers in Antiquities, FED. REG., https://
www.regulations.gov/document/FINCEN-2021-0006-0001/comment [https://perma.cc/WC83-9ZQL].
139. See generally id. (suggesting regulations are unnecessary and will prove overly
burdensome).
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issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and will publish a draft of the
proposed rule.140 The public can then comment on the rule before
FinCEN publishes the final rule.141 In the meantime, FinCEN issued
general guidance on antiquities to financial institutions already subject
to the Bank Secrecy Act. In March of 2021, FinCEN released a notice
on the trade in antiquities and urged financial institutions with existing
BSA obligations to be aware of crimes related to the art and antiquities
trade.142 The notice stated that “[c]rimes relating to antiquities and art
may include looting or theft, the illicit excavation of archaeological
items, smuggling, and the sale of stolen or counterfeit objects,”143 in
addition to the more commonly discussed crimes of money laundering,
sanctions evasion, and international terrorism.144 Looting is a crime
specific to the antiquities market, and when drafting rules, FinCEN
ought to take notice of this particularized risk in the market.
III. FINCEN SHOULD NOT ADHERE TOO CLOSELY TO U.K. ART
REGULATIONS OR PAST REGULATION OF THE JEWELRY INDUSTRY
WHEN IT DRAFTS REGULATION FOR ANTIQUITIES DEALERS
This Part will describe the Interim Regulation of Dealers in
Precious Metals, Precious Stones, and Jewelry (“Interim Regulation”)
and address why FinCEN should not mirror those regulations when
drafting regulations for antiquities dealers. Then, it will describe the
recent U.K. regulations of fine art dealers and argue that FinCEN
should not mirror them when drafting regulations for antiquities
dealers.

140. A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFF. OF THE FED. REG., https://www.federal
register.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2B4-DR3E].
141. Id.
142. FinCEN Notice, supra note 39, at 1.
143. Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).
144. Id.

SANNER PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/19/2022 4:38 PM

256

[Vol. 72:235

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

A. FinCEN Should Not Use the Interim Regulation for Precious
Metals, Stones, and Jewelry as a Template for Antiquities
Dealer Regulations
Congress has also made dealers in precious metals, stones, and
jewelry subject to the BSA.145 Some suspect that FinCEN will mirror
its earlier rule when drafting regulations of antiquities dealers.146 The
connection appears natural. Both industries are not typical “financial
institutions,” but nevertheless struggle with reputations for money
laundering. Importantly, both also raise questions about provenance.
Looted antiquities and conflict diamonds, commonly known as blood
diamonds,147 present similar regulatory questions. However, this
Section will discuss why the Interim Regulation for the jewelry industry
will fail to address the problems of the antiquities market.
The Interim Regulation requires that, at a minimum, a money
laundering program should “incorporate policies, procedures, and
internal controls based upon the dealer’s assessment of the money
laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with its line(s) of
business.”148 Jewelry dealers should consider factors such as “the
nature of the dealer’s customers, suppliers, distribution channels, and
geographic locations”149 and whether payment:
is routed to or from accounts located in jurisdictions that have been
identified by the Department of State as a sponsor of international
terrorism under 22 U.S.C. 2371; designated as non-cooperative with
international anti-money laundering principles or procedures by an
intergovernmental group or organization . . . or designated by the
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318A as warranting
special measures due to money laundering concerns.150

145. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(N) (including dealers in precious metals, stones, and jewelry
among covered “financial institutions”); see generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 1027.100–.540 (2022)
(implementing the requirements of the BSA).
146. See NYC BAR ASS’N, supra note 105 (noting that “[i]t is probable the [U.S. regulations]
will mirror [the U.K. regulations’] core obligations insofar as the BSA and FinCEN regulations
largely call for the same core obligations”).
147. Paul Armstrong, What Are ‘Conflict Diamonds?, CNN (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:07 AM), https:/
/www.cnn.com/2011/12/05/world/africa/conflict-diamonds-explainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/
NE9F-BVJB].
148. 31 C.F.R. § 1027.210(b)(1) (2022).
149. Id. § 1027.210(b)(1)(i)(A).
150. Id. § 1027.210(b)(1)(i)(C).
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Further red flags which indicate that a dealer might use a
transaction to facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing include
large amounts of cash, sequentially numbered money orders,
unwillingness of a customer to provide accurate identifying
information, attempts by the customer to maintain an unusual degree
of secrecy, and purchases that are unusual either for a particular
customer or for standard industry practice.151 However, there are three
problems with this approach.
First, the Interim Regulation omits mention of investigation of the
provenance of precious metals and stones. This omission is particularly
notable given diamond dealers also struggle to identify the source of
diamonds and to confirm that they were mined ethically. Countries in
West and Central Africa use “conflict diamonds,” mined through
coerced labor, to “fund conflict in war-torn areas.”152 Currently, an
international agreement called the Kimberly Process regulates the
diamond trade,153 which might account for Congress’s lack of emphasis
on the provenance of precious stones.154 Nevertheless, the antiquities
trade not only presents serious provenance concerns, but also lacks a
comparable Kimberly Process to address those concerns. Thus,
FinCEN should not mirror the Interim Regulation’s lack of
provenance due diligence.
Second, similar regulations of the jewelry industry in other
countries have been criticized as “highly complex, written for the
financial sector, and not tailored to Designated Non-Financial

151. Id. § 1027.210(b)(1)(ii).
152. Armstrong, supra note 147.
153. The Kimberly Process, which has been adopted by the U.N., the E.U., the World
Diamond Council, and the governments of seventy-four countries, requires members to certify
that rough diamond exports are conflict free. Id. Shipments must carry a certificate identifying
the source of the diamonds, the mining process, where they were cut and polished, who was
involved, and the ultimate destination. Id. Members cannot trade with non-members. Id.
154. Additionally, Congress and FinCEN might have been similarly more concerned about
terrorism and drug trafficking than about conflict diamonds. For example, in a speech to the
World Diamond Council given shortly after the adoption of regulations targeting the jewelry
market, the FinCEN director emphasized a case where narcotics traffickers converted cash
proceeds into gold. See William J. Fox, Director, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Speech at World
Diamond Council 3rd Annual Meeting 3 (Mar. 30, 2004), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/
files/2016-08/20040330.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQD8-JA7C]. Jewelers in the United States molded
this gold into belt buckles, tools, and bolts, which allowed the traffickers to safely smuggle it to
Colombia. Id.
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Businesses and Professions’ (“DNFBPs’”) business model.”155 The
Interim Regulation transposes red flags found in the financial sector
regulations like “large amounts of cash, [and] sequentially numbered
money orders,” to the jewelry industry.156 These red flags may not
apply to the jewelry industry, and certainly will not address the
problem of looted antiquities. Except in the somewhat unusual
situation that a dealer purchases an artifact directly from the criminal
enterprise, these red flags likely will not be present. Instead, FinCEN’s
regulations should target the specific business practices of antiquities
dealers.
Third, the Interim Regulation does not require dealers to file
SARs.157 SARs provide the government with important information on
suspicious activity, which federal agents can then investigate. They
allow dealers to report suspicious activity early and anonymously
without definite proof of wrongdoing, which might be difficult, or even
impossible, for small antiquities dealers to obtain.158 As a result, SARs
serve a useful function in the money-laundering space. FinCEN should
not hew too closely to the Interim Regulation and thereby fail to draft
rules that require dealers to file SARs when they encounter enough
red flags to suspect that the antiquities were looted.159 During this
Note’s publication process, Congress introduced a bill to amend the
Bank Secrecy Act, which required art and antiquities dealers to file

155. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 241 (discussing regulations
of the Belgian diamond industry). DNFBPs are “non-financial sector businesses that pose a
money laundering and terrorism financing threat” and include “auditors, external
accounts . . . tax advisors, casinos and other gambling service providers, dealers in precious metals
[and stones], lawyers, notaries . . . [, and] real estate agents.” Their business practices may vary
but they are not traditional financial institutions. Designated Non-Financial Businesses and
Professions (DNFBPs), COMPLY ADVANTAGE, https://complyadvantage.com/insights/antimoney-laundering/designated-non-financial-businesses-professions [https://perma.cc/4DRW-NPAZ].
156. 31 C.F.R. § 1027.210(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2022).
157. See id. § 1027.210 (omitting any mention of suspicious activity reports); GLOB. LEGAL
GRP., ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2020, INT’L COMPAR. LEGAL GUIDES 220 (Joel M. Cohen &
Stephanie L. Brooker eds., 3d ed. 2020) (noting that dealers in precious metals, precious stones,
or jewels are exempt from filing suspicious activity reports).
158. See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 797, 797–98 (2016) (noting that regulators turn to anti-money laundering laws to obtain
information in the first place because they “require gatekeepers [in this instance, dealers] to
report to regulators suspicions of misconduct, even without clear proof of fraud”).
159. See infra Part IV (discussing industry provenance guidelines that a FinCEN regulation
should incorporate).
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SARs.160 The bill was later amended to focus solely on lawyers and
trust companies,161 but Congress might eventually require antiquities
dealers to file SARs whether through the AMLA regulations or other
legislation.
B. FinCEN Should Not Use the Art Market Money Laundering
Regulations from the United Kingdom as a Template for
Antiquities Dealer Regulations
When drafting new regulations, FinCEN might also take cues
from the United Kingdom, which recently implemented a version of
the European Union’s Fifth Money Laundering Directive and released
its own regulations of art market participants.162 Industry-drafted
guidance, approved by HM Revenue & Customs and circulated
pursuant to these regulations, includes extensive client-focused due
diligence, but little emphasis on the artwork itself or its provenance.163

160. This bill initially required “trust companies, lawyers, art dealers and others [to]
investigate clients seeking to move money and assets into the American financial system.” Will
Fitzgibbon, House Panel Approves Expanding Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2022, 5:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/06/23/
pandora-papers-enablers-money-laundering-bill [https://perma.cc/M92J-JRDP]. If passed it
would have been an important step toward limiting the market for looted antiquities, but
regulations should still direct antiquities dealers to look at a broader definition of “suspicious
activity” with red flags for stolen and looted art generally. See infra Part IV.
161. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON RULES, 117TH CONG., AMEND. TO RULES COMM. PRINT:
SERVS. THAT OPEN PORTALS TO DIRTY MONEY 7 (Comm. Print 2022) (applying to corporate
arrangement or formation services, trust services, third party payment services, legal and
accounting services); see also Peter D. Hardy & James Mangiaracina, Closing the Gate: House
Adopts ENABLERS Act Amendment to 2023 NDAA, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July 21, 2022),
https://www.moneylaunderingnews.com/2022/07/closing-the-gate-house-adopts-enablers-act-am
endment-to-2023-ndaa [https://perma.cc/RP5N-M34Z].
162. The U.K. law does not yet cover antiquities dealers and the U.S. law does not yet cover
fine art, so regulations may differ accordingly. See MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 45 (describing
the U.K. and U.S. regulatory regimes).
163. See generally Guidance on Anti Money Laundering for UK Art Market Participants, HM
TREASURY (June 30, 2022) [hereinafter HM TREASURY], https://tbamf.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2022/07/BAMF-HMT-AML-Guidelines-30-June-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H2E8JR3] (outlining the requirements of a money laundering program and necessary due diligence).
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The guidance highlights geographic risk,164 customer risk,165 and
transaction risk.166 By contrast, the guidelines do not include any
assessment of the risk that the artwork was looted.167 This approach “is
consistent with what is already imposed on the banking world and is
not drafted specifically to cover the special art and antiquity market
situations.”168 Thus, the U.K. regulations present many of the same
limitations that the Interim Regulation does.
The U.K. guidelines provide one case study of criminal activity
that could be useful for FinCEN to incorporate, namely: “An art dealer
sells a sculpture and pays the net proceeds of sale to the seller. Had the
dealer, prior to the sale, carried out a lost/stolen art database check,
they would have discovered that the sculpture had been stolen in a high
profile theft from a museum.”169 Here, FinCEN should follow the
United Kingdom’s lead and instruct antiquities dealers to search
databases for stolen antiquities.170 However, other than this example,
the U.K regulations lack guidance specific to art theft.
FinCEN regulations appear poised to mirror the U.K. regulations
and the U.S. jewelry regulations and to deemphasize provenance. In
FinCEN’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the agency asked

164. Red flags for geographic ties include whether any countries with which the customer is
associated have high levels of corruption as measured by trustworthy governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Id. at 36–37. While high levels of corruption and antiquities looting
might frequently coincide, they will not always. For example, Chile appears on ICOM’s list for
elevated looting risk, Red Lists Database, ICOM, https://icom.museum/en/resources/red-lists
[https://perma.cc/K5WR-A3E9], but is tied with the United States for corruption, Corruption
Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020 [https://
perma.cc/QYC7-BSH6].
165. Red flags for customers include the nature of the customer’s business and its association
with high-corruption industries, the customer’s reputation, and the customer’s behavior when
interacting with the art market participant. HM TREASURY, supra note 163, at 37.
166. Red flags for transactions include the transparency, complexity, and size of the
transaction. Id. at 40.
167. See NYC BAR ASS’N, supra note 105 (“The UK regulations require AML programs to
center on 1) the funds that a buyer is delivering and 2) the agency relationships. The focus is not
the property [being] sold, which is typically at the core of the antiquity issues . . . .”).
168. Id.
169. HM TREASURY, supra note 163, at 8. For a discussion of stolen art databases, see infra
Part IV.B (providing examples of stolen art databases and a discussion of their utility and
limitations).
170. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that FinCEN regulations require dealers check stolen art
databases).
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industry members for insight into the antiquities market.171 Specifically,
FinCEN asked for recommendations on what an antiquities dealer is,
how an antiquity should be defined, and whether dealers should have
to identify beneficial owners.172 FinCEN did not ask about objectcentered due diligence or red flags for looting. The notice referred
repeatedly to “money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit
financial activity” but never explicitly mentioned looting or illegal
excavation.173 These questions emphasize customer and transaction
due diligence and neglect artifact-centric due diligence.
IV. TO MAXIMIZE EFFICACY AGAINST LOOTING, REGULATIONS
OUGHT TO EMPHASIZE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF LOOTING WHEN
OUTLINING SAR REQUIREMENTS
To best address the problem of looted antiquities, regulations
should incorporate museum and dealer voluntary guidance. For
instance, regulations could take inspiration from recommendations
formulated by Responsible Art Market (“RAM”),174 the Association
of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”),175 and the International
Foundation for Art Research (“IFAR”).176 Unlike the U.K. antimoney laundering regulations, which emphasize client and transaction
due diligence,177 the RAM toolkit also includes due diligence checklists
for the artwork itself.178 Industry provenance guides provide more
detailed information on how to best investigate the provenance of an
171. See Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Dealers in Antiquities, 86 Fed. Reg. 53,021,
53,021 (proposed Sept. 24, 2021) (“This [advance notice of proposed rulemaking] seeks initial
public comment on questions that will assist FinCEN in preparing the proposed rules
[implementing the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020].”).
172. Id. at 53,023–24.
173. See id.
174. See generally Art Transaction Due Diligence Toolkit, RESPONSIBLE ART MKT.
[hereinafter RESPONSIBLE ART MKT.], http://responsibleartmarket.org/guidelines/art-transac
tion-due-diligence-toolkit [https://perma.cc/FD53-6SLY] (providing a due diligence tool to
evaluate risk in art transactions).
175. See generally Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art
(Revised 2013), AAMD (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Guidelines], https://aamd.org/sites/
default/files/document/AAMD%20Guidelines%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/84FF-WYJ7]
(providing museums with an ethics guide for the acquisition of cultural property).
176. See generally Provenance Guide, IFAR, https://www.ifar.org/Provenance_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN7N-8SYM] (providing a practical guide to conducting provenance research).
177. See supra notes 163–167 and accompanying text.
178. See generally RESPONSIBLE ART MKT., supra note 174 (including sections on Client Due
Diligence, Artwork Due Diligence, and Transaction Due Diligence).
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artifact. While the industry already utilizes these tools to some degree,
voluntary compliance programs only incentivize investigation to a
certain point. Once compliance with guidelines becomes inconvenient
or overly costly, art market participants are free to abandon them
because they do not have the force of law. This Part will first introduce
possible provenance guidelines that could serve as models for the
FinCEN regulation. It will then discuss which elements of those
guidelines should be incorporated into regulations.
A. Industry Guidance Provides Insight into Investigation of
Provenance
RAM emphasizes identifying the artwork as an artifact early on
since cultural property is more heavily protected than other forms of
art.179 It then recommends checking the artifact against the
International Council of Museum (“ICOM”)’s “red lists” database or
with various countries’ cultural ministries and departments to
determine if the artifact comes from an area with heavy illicit
trafficking.180 RAM also stresses that the dealer establish the country
of origin of the artifact and “when and how it left its country of origin
and any intermediate country.”181 RAM suggests that dealers use
export documents, wills and dated inventories, publications in
reputable sources such as auction catalogues, photos and family
correspondence, and excavation field notes to establish provenance.182
It cautions dealers against forged documents and urges them to consult
with experts in the relevant country to guard against fake documents.183
Finally, RAM advises that if artifacts can be traced to at-risk countries
and excavation periods, that dealers should search databases for stolen
artifacts.184
The International Foundation for Art Research published a
provenance guide that provides advice for conducting art research.185
IFAR notes that “the only way to confirm that a work of art passed
through the hands of a dealer is to ask the dealer or to check a dealer’s
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See generally Provenance Guide, supra note 176 (providing a practical guide to
conducting provenance research).
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files.”186 This may be impossible for galleries that have closed,187 but
dealers should attempt to locate records. Auction records are
comparatively easy to verify when conducting research.188 The
provenance guide specifically addresses “claims by foreign ‘source’
countries for objects they believe were exported in violation of
patrimony or export laws.”189 IFAR also provides a collection of links
to stolen art databases, object registries, and compilations of looting
legislation.190 The IFAR research guide is freely available to dealers,
but it has no legal force.
The Association of Art Museum Directors published Guidelines
on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art.191
While these guidelines were written for museums, elements could help
FinCEN draft regulations for dealers. The guidelines require museums
to research ownership history. Museums must obtain written
documentation and import and export documents in compliance with
the export laws of the country of previous export and the United
States.192 The guidelines also suggest that museums require sellers,
donors, and representatives to provide any documentation they
possess.193 The guidelines note that even after extensive research,
artworks may lack a complete documented history.194 In this case,
further relevant factors include the circumstances of public displays of
the work, the provenance history of other works excavated from the
same site, prior owners and any claims made against them with respect
to other works, and communications about the work between the
country of discovery and the current or prior owner.195 The AAMD
guidelines have been criticized for providing too many loopholes which
allow for the acquisition of artifacts with questionable provenances,196
186. Id. at 8.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1.
190. See id. at 21–23 (linking to the AAMD Object Registry, database of lost and stolen
artworks from Latin America, database of lost treasures from Iraq, and the Art Loss Register,
among others).
191. 2013 Guidelines, supra note 175.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id.
196. See Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at
191 (“[T]he Association of Art Museum Directors’ guidelines, adopted in June 2004, on the
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but their notes on relevant factors could be useful for dealers to
consider.
B. FinCEN Should Incorporate Themes from Industry Guidance
into Regulations of Antiquities Dealers
These guidelines introduce recurring themes that should be
incorporated into regulations. First, regulations should adopt a riskbased approach with a focus on country of origin, where high-risk
countries like Syria, Iraq, and Cambodia trigger enhanced due
diligence. Dealers should refer to databases like ICOM to determine
whether a country presents an elevated risk of trafficking in looted
antiquities. The red list database currently includes thirty-four
countries with heavy trafficking as well as information on what
regularly trafficked items from each of those countries looks like.197 For
example, the ICOM red list for Iraq specifies that circular, square, or
rectangular clay or stone tablets with cuneiform writing—like the
Dream Tablet—are notably trafficked from Iraq.198
Similarly, in 2010 when Hobby Lobby purchased a different set of
Iraqi antiquities, which were also eventually forfeited, Hobby Lobby’s
expert told them that he “would regard the acquisition of any artifact
likely from Iraq . . . as carrying considerable risk.”199 He mentioned
that “particularly popular on the market and likely to have been looted
are cylinder seals, cuneiform tablets.”200 Such artifacts should be
viewed with more skepticism as dealers determine whether to acquire
an object or to file a SAR. Dealers in precious stones must consider
whether payment is routed to or from countries “designated as noncooperative with international anti-money laundering principles or

acquisition of ancient art and antiquities have numerous loopholes.”). But see 2013 Guidelines,
supra note 175, at 1 (noting that the 2008 guidelines deleted “the provision that allowed the
acquisition of objects with at least 10 years of provenance and the addition of a requirement for
provenance demonstrating that the object was out of its country of modern discovery prior to or
legally exported therefrom after November 17, 1970”).
197. See Red Lists Database, supra note 164 (allowing users to select “material,” “type of
object,” and “country,” and providing thirty-four options for “country”).
198. Emergency Red List of Iraqi Cultural Objects at Risk, ICOM (2015), https://icom.museum
/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/RedListIraq_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9QX-4YJC] (describing
frequently trafficked writing, stamps and seals, architectural elements, figural sculpture, vessels
and containers, accessories and instruments, and coins).
199. Complaint at 10, United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient
Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-CV-03980 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017).
200. Id. at 11.
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procedures by an intergovernmental group or organization.”201
Regulations of antiquities dealers should go further and target
countries considered high-risk, not only for money laundering, but also
for antiquities looting.
Regulations should also require that dealers make efforts to
independently verify the provenance of artifacts, most importantly
when they were excavated and when they were transported to the
United States. U.K. regulations place more emphasis on establishing
the identities of the parties and their source of funds than on obtaining
documentation for the provenance of art.202 Particularly since the
AMLA applies specifically to antiquities dealers, regulations should
emphasize independent verification of the source of the artifact. RAM
and provenance guides provide insight into the usefulness of different
documents for establishing provenance, which could be incorporated
into regulation to some degree. Additionally, regulations should stress
the importance of consulting with experts on the veracity of documents
since they can be easily falsified.
Regulations should require dealers to check the various databases
that track stolen and looted art. These databases only track artifacts
that have been stolen from museums, collections, and monuments.203
Artifacts pulled directly from the ground will not be included.204 While
not every looted artifact can be found in a database, dealers should, at
the very least, need to verify that there is not an affirmative record that
an antiquity is stolen. This approach has had some success in Italy,
which in the past has been plagued by theft of antiquities and church
relics.205 In 2013, heritage heists dropped from 891 the previous year,
to 676.206 There, the Carabinieri police created an electronic resource,
also available as an app, with almost six million images of looted
objects, “including some that have been missing for decades.”207 Other
databases that are helpful for tracking down stolen antiquities include

201. 31 C.F.R. § 1027.210(b)(1)(i)(C) (2022).
202. See supra notes 162–168 and accompanying text (noting that U.K. regulations cover
geographic, customer, transaction due diligence but not artifact-centric due diligence).
203. See Brodie, supra note 100 (“Illegally-excavated and thus undocumented material will
not appear on a stolen art database . . . .”).
204. Id.
205. Judith Harris, Preying on Italian Churches, ARTNEWS (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:30 AM), https:/
/www.artnews.com/art-news/news/art-theft-in-italian-churches-3085 [https://perma.cc/6PKV-NSSX].
206. Id.
207. Id.
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the Art Loss Register, Art Recovery International, ARTIVE, National
Stolen Art File, and more.208
Finally, certain contextual signs, such as the condition of the
artifacts or the way they are displayed prior to sale, indicate an
increased risk of looting. In 2010, Hobby Lobby president Steve Green
visited the United Arab Emirates to make an artifact purchase.209
When he arrived, the artifacts were “spread on the floor, arranged in
layers on a coffee table, and packed loosely in cardboard boxes, in
many instances with little or no protective material between them.”210
The antiquities expert who accompanied him recognized that the
transaction was suspicious.211 Likely, any reputable dealer would
realize the same.212 Similarly, the Gilgamesh tablet was initially sold to
the American dealer “encrusted with dirt and unreadable.”213
Anything that indicates an artifact was recently pulled out of the
ground, was not treated carefully in excavation, or was disguised as
insignificant during transit should be considered along with other red
flags.214 And just as regulations mention financial red flags, they ought

208. See About Us, ART LOSS REG., https://www.artloss.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/
S5JK-7E2R] (logging over 700,000 lost, stolen, or looted artwork and antiquities); Wanted, ART
RECOVERY I NT’ L, https://www.artrecovery.com/theft-alert [https://perma.cc/R3Z9-LHFX]
(issuing theft alerts with law-enforcement approved rewards for information on stolen art); Due
Diligence & Research, ARTIVE, https://www.artive.org/database [https://perma.cc/2QAK-639K]
(providing a free database of antiquities to promote due diligence and to combat illicit activity);
National Stolen Art File, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
violent-crime/art-theft/national-stolen-art-file [https://perma.cc/RH7G-4EYW] (compiling
a database of stolen art and cultural property reported to the FBI).
209. Complaint at 8, United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient
Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-CV-03980 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017) (referring to Steve Green as “the
President [of Hobby Lobby]” rather than by name).
210. Id. at 8.
211. Id. at 10–11.
212. Cf. Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities, supra note 17, at
179 (noting that market participants may acknowledge that looted artifacts present a real
problem, “but they all claim that they themselves do not engage in any shady practices and that
they conduct their business in an ethical manner”).
213. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of N.Y., Rare Cuneiform Tablet Bearing Portion
of Epic of Gilgamesh Forfeited to U.S. (July 27, 2021) [hereinafter Press Release, Rare Cuneiform
Tablet], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rare-cuneiform-tablet-bearing-portion-epic-gilgameshforfeited-united-states [https://perma.cc/RA6B-J93H].
214. Investigators in Bulgaria seized artifacts from a smuggling network. Steven Lee Myers &
Nicholas Kulish, ‘Broken System’ Allows ISIS To Profit from Looted Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world/europe/iraq-syria-antiquities-islamicstate.html [https://perma.cc/3SZD-EJQ8]. Those artifacts were “encrusted with dirt, suggesting
they had been excavated recently, not taken from a museum.” Id. Artifacts are likely to be clean
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to mention red flags particular to the market for antiquities, so that
dealers understand when to file SARs.
C. Industry Guidance Would Have Identified the Gilgamesh
Tablet as a Risky Sale
Adequate provenance research could have prevented Christie’s
from selling the Gilgamesh tablet to Hobby Lobby. Christie’s provided
Hobby Lobby with a provenance which read “Butterfield and
Butterfield, San Francisco, 20 August 1981, lot 1503 with Michael
Sharpe Rare and Antiquarian Books, Pasadena, California.”215 This
provenance inaccurately indicated that the tablet was in the United
States in 1981, prior to any restrictions on the importation of Iraqi
cultural property.216 When Hobby Lobby questioned Christie’s further,
Christie’s provided additional information about Butterfield and told
Hobby Lobby that it had confirmed the provenance in 2014.217
However, Christie’s provenance research should have unearthed
several red flags. The tablet is from modern-day Iraq, which presents
considerable risk of looting. It is a stone tablet with cuneiform
inscriptions, another regularly looted category of object. Further, the
American dealer who bought the tablet in London purchased it
“encrusted with dirt and unreadable” in another dealer’s living room.218
These contextual clues provide evidence of suspicious activity. Finally,
Christie’s likely knew or should have discovered this information in its
research. Christie’s Head of Antiquities in London called the
American dealer who allegedly said that the provenance “was ‘not
verifiable’ and ‘would not hold up to scrutiny in a public auction.’”219
Christie’s then sold the tablet directly to Hobby Lobby, rather than at
public auction.220

at the time of sale because conservation is “the final stage in the laundering process which
transforms looted antiquities into art commodities: objects go in dirty, corroded, and broken, and
come out clean, shiny, and whole.” Catherine Sease, Conservation and the Antiquities Trade, 36
J. AM. INST. CONSERVATION 49, 53 (1997).
215. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Christie’s Inc., 20-CV-2239, 2021 WL 4301542, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021).
216. Id.
217. Id. at *2.
218. Press Release, Rare Cuneiform Tablet, supra note 213.
219. Hobby Lobby, 2021 WL 4301542, at *3 (quoting ECF No. 18-3 ¶¶ 25–26).
220. See Sarah Cascone, Once Smuggled out of Iraq, the Gilgamesh Dream Tablet Has Been
Seized by U.S. Authorities and Will Be Returned, ARTNET (July 28, 2021), https://news.artnet.com/
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In this case, Christie’s likely knew that questions surrounded the
Dream Tablet even if it did not know that the tablet had been stolen
from an Iraqi museum. The threat of regulatory examination and fines
under the Bank Secrecy Act could have counseled against agreeing to
sell the tablet to Hobby Lobby. Had the provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act applied to Christie’s at the time, the auction house may have feared
that the sketchily drawn provenance would be uncovered in a
regulatory examination. It might have worried that the government
would later check to see if Christie’s had filed a SAR for the
transaction.221 And hopefully, as art market participants begin to
integrate compliance functions more thoroughly into their business,
Christie’s employees’ attitude toward the sale of risky antiquities will
begin to shift.
These regulations will not be excessively burdensome to art
dealers, even with the difficulty of affirmatively establishing
provenance. First, these suggestions are drawn largely from industry
guidance already endorsed by various art market participants.222
Dealers profess to adhere to these practices already;223 this proposal
would merely give them the force of law. Second, if a dealer makes a
well-informed decision about the risk that an artifact presents, based
on documented attempts at provenance research and an established
compliance program, the dealer should not be penalized even if the
artifact turns about to be looted. These proposals penalize dealers who

art-world/government-forfeiture-hobby-lobby-gilgamesh-tablet-1993303 [https://perma.cc/
6CKX-P6ND] (“Christie’s auction house brokered the $1.67 million private sale of the artifact.”).
221. The government will, on rare occasions, sanction financial institutions for failing to file
SARs. See infra note 239.
222. See What Is the Responsible Art Market Initiative?, RESPONSIBLE ART MKT., http://
responsibleartmarket.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/47P2-9TTJ] (“RAM’s founding members
span the entire spectrum of the art market and include art businesses, institutions and
practitioners.”); Working Group Members, RESPONSIBLE ART MKT., http://responsibleart
market.org/organisation [https://perma.cc/LWQ3-S7ZW] (listing Christie’s as a founding
member).
223. Antiquities dealer trade associations emphasize the importance of due diligence. See
Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L ASS’N OF DEALERS IN ANCIENT ART, https://iadaa.org/
imprint/faq [https://perma.cc/8HXF-JWCV] (describing how antiquities dealers can and should
perform due diligence). For instance, IADAA states “[b]uyers should always purchase antiquities
from a reputable dealer who belongs to a trade organisation and will consequently be bound by
a strict code of conduct guaranteeing authenticity and good title.” Id. IADAA mentions the
importance of conducting due diligence and checking for documentation. Id. However, the
IADAA also emphasizes the dealer’s “specialist knowledge and ‘eye,’” which is not unassailable
evidence the way valid documentation is. Id.
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falsify provenance, decline to investigate provenance, or willfully
ignore provenance red flags.
Further, the risk-based approach to compliance224 provides a
rebuttal to the criticism that compliance with new regulations will be
unreasonably expensive for small dealers. This Note does not take a
position on how much revenue a dealer must have before it becomes
subject to the Bank Secrecy Act requirements.225 Regardless, a riskbased approach will not force small-time dealers to establish expensive
compliance programs on the level of those instituted by major auction
houses.226 In small galleries, “one person may have to perform multiple
roles, including overseeing the program.”227 Further, “other small
businesses subject to similar requirements” have managed to develop
cost-effective AML programs.228 A dealer who trades primarily in
American objects with values under $5000 has a very different risk
profile from an auction house that deals in Iraqi tablets worth hundreds
of thousands of dollars.
V. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON AML COULD CREATE A “CULTURE
OF COMPLIANCE”
Adoption of these recommendations may begin to shift the
antiquities market’s attitude toward compliance and transparency.
This Part argues that antiquities dealers could eventually become
willing partners in the enforcement of regulations. It then provides the
Belgian diamond industry as a case study.
A. Regulation of Antiquities Dealers Could Prompt a Cultural
Shift in the Market
Targeted regulation of antiquities dealers could prompt a cultural
shift in the art market for several reasons. First, currently dealers
224. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing the risk-based approach).
225. However, small dealers without any sort of compliance program may present a more
significant threat than large auction houses with established due diligence practices. See
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 61 (noting that the only private art dealer
interviewed did not maintain any written AML or sanctions policies, in contrast with the major
auction houses).
226. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 214 (“Regulators do not
require art dealers to bankrupt themselves developing and implementing a risk-based program.”).
227. Id. (noting that very small financial institutions have similar practices).
228. DELOITTE, FIVE INSIGHTS INTO THE ART MARKET AND MONEY LAUNDERING 5
(2018).
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struggle with voluntary compliance programs and patchwork
regulatory systems. Voluntary compliance programs require dealers to
explain to clients that internal policies prohibit anonymity and require
complete provenances.229 By contrast, under a mandatory regulatory
system dealers could provide clients with letters, drafted by industry
representatives, which explain regulatory requirements.230 Currently,
dealers also worry that if they are subject to more regulations than their
competitors, their businesses will suffer.231 FinCEN regulation will
bring the regulatory frameworks of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union closer together.232 FinCEN might
add regulations for fine art,233 and the E.U. and U.K. regulations will
likely begin to cover antiquities.
Second, the antiquities market currently has a reputation problem.
Reports abound of ISIS deriving income from looted antiquities in
Syria and Iraq.234 Looting reportedly increased during the COVID-19
pandemic,
as
“[s]ocial
instability
and
financial
235
pressures . . . combine[d].” In Fall of 2021, just three years after
paying a three million dollar fine for its acquisition of looted Iraqi
229. See MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 46 (noting that a prior advisory note “strongly
recommend[ing]” that U.S. dealers adopt a risk-based approach to AML was a “worst-case
scenario” because dealers couldn’t point to legal requirements when they asked customers for
personal information).
230. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 242 (“AWDC has addressed
[the problem of clients unfamiliar with new legislation] by drafting standard letters for clients
explaining the Belgian AMLL, how Belgian suppliers fall under its scope, which information
needs to be provided to them and why.”).
231. See MCANDREW, supra note 21, at 45 (discussing the difficulty if a dealer is covered by
AML laws but the agent and client are in a region that is not covered by local AML laws).
232. See id. (“This uneven playing field for the many US/UK transactions that occur appears
to be a relatively short-term discrepancy, as the US is aggressively enhancing its own efforts to
expand money laundering regulations.”).
233. Congress commissioned a report on regulation of the fine art market when it passed the
AMLA. This report concluded “that the art market should not be an immediate focus for the
imposition of comprehensive AML/CFT requirements.” DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STUDY OF
THE FACILITATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR FINANCE THROUGH THE TRADE IN
WORKS OF ART 1 (2022). The report acknowledges the benefits of international harmonization
but concludes that it is not an immediate priority. Id. at 33.
234. E.g., Benoit Faucon, Georgi Kantchev & Alistair MacDonald, The Men Who Trade ISIS
Loot, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-men-who-trade-isisloot-1502017200 [https://perma.cc/8X33-KRA6].
235. Roger Matthews, Looting of Antiquities Has Increased Under Lockdown – Here’s How
We’re Working To Prevent This in Iraq, CONVERSATION (June 18, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://
theconversation.com/looting-of-antiquities-has-increased-under-lockdown-heres-how-wereworking-to-prevent-this-in-iraq-139528 [https://perma.cc/5LB3-SJNM].
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artifacts, Hobby Lobby returned the Gilgamesh tablet to Iraq in a
heavily publicized forfeiture. Most recently, the Pandora Papers
revealed a trove of objects with provenances tied to indicted antiquities
dealer, Douglas Latchford, held by the British Museum in London, the
Cleveland Museum of Art, the Denver Art Museum, the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York, and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston,
among others.236 These media reports harm the reputation of the
antiquities industry and may hurt business.
This reputation problem might be key to shifting attitudes among
antiquities dealers. Deserved or not, the art market is known as a
money laundering hub. Despite challenges posed by regulations,
“industries
that
have
gone
through
similar
transition
periods . . . suggest that the reputational benefits of a more transparent
and professionally compliant environment ultimately create more trust
and favor the expansion of the market.”237 Enthusiastic adoption of the
new regulations could assuage buyer concerns about the threat of
money laundering or forfeiture of looted items. Hobby Lobby might
be more hesitant the next time it tries to acquire an artifact, and dealers
could use policies implemented pursuant to government regulation to
reassure them.
Third, government enforcement of regulations might shift the risk
calculus that dealers undertake when they decide to buy or sell an
artifact. Dealers may be more hesitant to engage in questionable
provenance practices if they worry that such activity, or at the very least
inadequate compliance procedures, might be uncovered in a regulatory
examination. Regulatory examinations have resulted in penalties in the
precious metals industry.238 Additionally, dealers will hopefully be
incentivized to engage in monitoring and to file SARs because FinCEN
can impose civil monetary penalties for failure to file a SAR. In the
financial industry FinCEN “penalized First National Community Bank
(“FNCB”) $1.5 million for failing to file suspicious activity reports

236. Washington Post Staff, Responses from Museums to Pandora Papers Antiquities
Investigation, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2021/10/05/museums-response-pandora-papers-antiquities [https://perma.cc/S66P-MJPT].
237. DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 16.
238. See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Assesses Money Penalty Against
Precious Metals Dealer for Violations of Anti-Money Laundering Laws (Dec. 30, 2015), https://
www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-assesses-money-penalty-against-precious-metalsdealer-violations-anti [https://perma.cc/4P9K-7H8L] (assessing a $200,000 penalty against a
precious metals business in L.A. for violations of the BSA).
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despite the existence of significant red flags.”239 FinCEN also “analyzes
SAR data to identify institutions with filing problems, such as missing
information or incomplete SAR narratives.”240 Discovery of failure to
file SARs related to looting might be unlikely and the penalties might
be low, but regulations provide significantly more deterrence than the
current self-regulatory practices, which rely almost entirely on
reputational risk.
B. Case Study: The Belgian Diamond Industry
The Belgian diamond industry demonstrates the possible effects
of Bank Secrecy Act regulation on an industry that was unregulated
until recently. The diamond industry more closely mirrors the
antiquities market than most other industries,241 and thus provides
insight to how antiquities dealers in the United States might react to
regulation. The initial regulation of the Belgium diamond industry
prompted negative reactions and traders considered compliance “as
nothing but a box-ticking exercise.”242 Initially, traders who attended
AML seminars held by the Antwerp World Diamond Center
(“AWDC”) came primarily to vent their frustrations with the new
regulations.243 However, over time the AWDC noticed a shift in
attitudes.244 Diamond traders, and even members of the financial sector
began attending seminars to learn how they could stay up-to-date on
compliance practices.245 Importantly, in Europe where diamond
dealers are required to file SARs, the number of qualified SAR
notifications has increased significantly since the regulations were first
promulgated.246 The AWDC attributes this shift to the tools provided
to help traders implement AML programs in a cost-effective way and
239. Matthew Orso, Mind the Red Flags – FinCEN Issues Penalty for Failure To File SARs on
Director’s Suspicious Activity, SUBJECT TO INQUIRY (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.subject
toinquiry.com/uncategorized/mind-the-red-flags-fincen-issues-penalty-for-failure-to-file-sars-ondirectors-suspicious-activity [https://perma.cc/2EGY-WUBE].
240. Supervisory Insights: Connecting the Dots . . . The Importance of Timely and Effective
Suspicious Activity Reports, FDIC (Dec. 28, 2021), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examin
ations/supervisory/insights/siwin07/article03_connecting.html [https://perma.cc/8488-G2WJ].
241. See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (“[D]iamond dealers also struggle to
identify the source of diamonds and to confirm that they were mined ethically.”).
242. DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 241.
243. Id. at 242.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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to a realization that no industry “benefits from a bad reputation such
as being a money laundering hub.”247 The diamond industry counters
to some extent the argument that these regulations would be overly
burdensome.
CONCLUSION
Antiquities looting permanently destroys records of the past.
Artifacts ripped from the ground are also ripped out of their historical
context. Untrained excavators may permanently break and destroy
artifacts in the process of looting. These antiquities are then moved
from politically unstable regions to economic powerhouses like New
York, London, and Hong Kong so that wealthy individuals can buy
them to display in private homes. The Bank Secrecy Act presents an
opportunity to address the problem with compliance programs,
monitoring, and proactive reporting. But to have its intended effect,
new regulations should not simply transpose financial regulations to
the antiquities context. Regulations must be tailored to the problems
of the antiquities market. And if the government indicates that it is
taking the threat that looted antiquities pose seriously, dealers will
have incentive to follow.

247. Id. at 242–43.

